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ABSTRACT 
Georgia has a résumé of achievements in its relations with NATO since 1992. However, 
at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the NATO Allies chose not to offer Georgia a 
Membership Action Plan. At the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, the NATO Allies again 
chose not to offer Georgia such a plan. This thesis examines Georgia’s prospects for 
NATO membership. It investigates the hypothesis that Georgia’s membership aspirations 
are affected by two sets of variables—internal and external. The two key internal 
variables that affect Georgia’s prospects for membership are Tbilisi’s progress on 
reforms and the unresolved conflicts with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The NATO Allies will continue to evaluate Georgia on its efforts to democratize, 
develop a market economy, and create a professional military that contributes to Euro-
Atlantic security. Georgia notes that the separatist regions are within its internationally 
recognized borders, but neither region desires to be reconciled with the government in 
Tbilisi. The primary external variable remains Russia’s policy toward Georgia. Russia is 
opposed to Georgia joining NATO and has since the August 2008 Georgia-Russia war 
recognized the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Georgia has had a long relationship with NATO. It began in June 1992, when 
Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).1  Membership in the 
NACC took place against the backdrop of Georgia’s newfound independence after nearly 
70 years of Soviet rule. Two years after joining the NACC, Georgia joined the 
Partnership for Peace program, which has the goal of improving security and defense-
related cooperation between NATO and partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic Region.2 
Georgia was also a founding member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).3 
While simultaneously being associated with NATO partnership organizations, Georgia 
was also associated with post-Soviet organizations such as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and the Council of Defense Ministers. Georgia’s dual 
arrangement changed after its Rose Revolution in 2003. Georgia made membership in 
NATO a top priority.4  
On 29 October 2004, Georgia became the first country to agree to an Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).5  Georgia’s IPAP was followed in 2006 by NATO’s 
offer of an Intensified Dialogue which, some observers hold, was the highpoint of 
 
1 The NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020201.htm (accessed 22 
January 2010). 
2 NATO’s Relations with Georgia. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm (accessed 22 
January 2010). 
3 KŘÍŽ, Zdeněk and Zinaida SHEVCHUK.” Georgia on the Way to NATO after the Russian Georgian 
Armed Conflict in 2008” Defense and Strategy. (2009), 101–115 
http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-1-2009/clanky/georgia-on-the-way-to-nato-after-the-
russian-georgian-armed-conflict-in-2008.html (accessed 7 January 2010), 103. 
4 Paul Gallis, Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit. Congressional Research Service. 
(2008), 21. 
5 Individual Partnership Action Plans. http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html (accessed 22 January 
2010). 
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Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s efforts to move closer toward the alliance.6 As 
Georgia oriented itself closer to NATO, it severed its ties with post-Soviet organizations 
such as the Council of Defense Ministers and the CIS itself. Georgia withdrew from the 
CIS Defense Council in 20067 and from the CIS completely three years later in August 
2009.8 Georgian President Saakashvili referred to the move as the “final goodbye to the 
Soviet Union.”9  
During Georgia’s nearly twenty-year association with NATO, it has developed an 
impressive résumé with favorable prospects for eventual membership in the alliance. It 
was expected in 2007 and early 2008 that Georgia would receive a Membership Action 
Plan (MAP). However, at NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Georgia’s path to 
membership stalled. The NATO heads of state and government agreed that Georgia 
would become a member of NATO but set no timeline.  
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for 
membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become 
members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to 
Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and 
Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in 
Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their 
direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these 
countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of 
intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the 
questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have 
asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their 
December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide 
on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.10 
 
6 Kakha Jibladze. “Russia’s Opposition to Georgia’s Quest for NATO Membership.” Central Asia-
Caucuses Institute Silk Road Studies Program, China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly 5. No 1. (2007), 45–
51, 47. 
7 Georgia Withdraws from CIS defense Council 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/georgia/hypermail/200602/0019.shtml (accessed 22 January 2010). 
8 Georgia Finalizes Withdrawal from the CIS 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Finalizes_Withdrawal_From_CIS/1802284.html (accessed 22 
January 2010). 
9 Ibid. 
10 North Atlantic Council, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, par. 23, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 22 January 
2010). 
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At the April 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl Summit the NATO heads of state and 
government “reaffirmed” their decision that Georgia would become a member of NATO, 
yet again they set no timeline.11  
The reluctance of NATO to offer a MAP to Tbilisi suggests that Georgia still has 
some areas that it must improve in to enhance its prospects for membership. 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the challenges that Georgia must 
overcome in its efforts to obtain membership in NATO and analyze how those challenges 
complicate Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Georgia’s success or failure in seeking membership in NATO has the potential for 
an impact that would be felt not only in Georgia, but also in the Caucasus and beyond. 
Within Georgia, the failure to obtain membership in NATO could be a setback for 
democracy. Some believe that Georgia is a post-Soviet country with a great chance to 
make a democratic transition.12 Georgian citizens demonstrated their feelings about 
autocracy by removing two authoritarian presidents over the course of 15 years.13 After 
the Rose Revolution Georgia chose to look toward NATO, the European Union, and 
democracy instead of simultaneously cultivating relations with Russia or seeking 
alignment with Russia. Should Georgia not obtain NATO membership and be truly 
integrated with Euro-Atlantic institutions, Georgian reforms could potentially stop and 






11 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration, 4 April 2009, par 29, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed 22 January 2010). 
12 Chatham House. The Georgia Challenge and the New U.S. Administration, Europe, and Russia., 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13314_210109summary.pdf (accessed 7 January 2010). 
13 Temuri Yakobashvili. “Georgia’s Path to NATO.” In Next Steps in Forging a Euro-Atlantic 
Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, edited by Ronald Asmus. 185- 196. Washington, DC: The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006, 187. 
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credibility, and this could reopen the door for autocratic or other leaders opposed to 
democracy to gain influence.14 Georgia could also potentially become another case study 
in superpresidentialism.15  
Should Georgia decide to seek an alternative to democratization and closer ties 
with the NATO and the European Union, the other South Caucasus states may deepen 
their relationships with Russia at the expense of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Such a 
development would certainly benefit Russia, which is a major player in the region and an 
opponent of Georgia’s NATO ambitions. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia “give 
increasingly frequent signals of readiness to participate in transatlantic cooperation at a 
much more advanced level than the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program currently offers. 
In private conversation, highly placed officials from these countries do not hide their 
hope of seeing closer cooperation with NATO develop into actual membership.”16  It 
must be pointed out that of the three countries Armenia has the closest ties to Russia.17  
Georgia’s location makes it a country of geostrategic importance. Temuri 
Yakobashvili writes that “Georgia is on the border between Europe and Asia, between the 
former Ottoman, Russian and Persian Empires and their contemporary successor states, 
between democratic, autocratic and theocratic forms of governance and is literally the 
meat in a sandwich of terrorism, between the North Caucasus and the Middle East. 
Without a clear orientation, Georgia will find itself quickly relegated to the league of 
failed states, taking on various features of the countries in its immediate 
neighborhood.”18 Georgia is also an energy transit country for oil and natural gas from 
 
14 Temuri Yakobashvili. “Georgia’s Path to NATO.” In Next Steps in Forging a Euro-Atlantic 
Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, edited by Ronald Asmus, 185–196. Washington, DC: The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006, 194.  
15 Steven M. Fish. 2001. “The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion.” Postcommunism and the Theory of 
Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 69. 
16 Temuri Yakobashvili. “Georgia’s Path to NATO.” In Next Steps in Forging a Euro-Atlantic 
Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, edited by Ronald Asmus, 185–196. DC: The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, 2006, 191–192. 
17 Vladimir Socor. “NATO Prospects on the South Caucuses” Central Asia Caucuses Institute, School 
of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, On the Occasion of the NATO Summi,.(2004). 
18 Temuri Yakobashvili. “Georgia’s Path to NATO.” In Next Steps in Forging a Euro-Atlantic 
Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, edited by Ronald Asmus. 185–196. DC: The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, 2006, 185. 
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the Caspian Sea region to European and world markets as well as an access corridor for 
U.S. and NATO forces in Central Asia and the Middle East.19 Ensuring access to 
Caspian energy resources and promoting democratic advancement are important to EU 
and NATO countries. This point was emphasized in 2005 by General James Jones, the 
EUCOM commander at the time:  
The Caucasus is increasingly important to our interests. Its air corridor has 
become a crucial lifeline between coalition forces in Afghanistan and our 
bases in Europe. Caspian oil, carried through the Caucasus, may constitute 
as much as 25 percent of the world’s growth in oil production over the 
next five years. This region is a geographical pivot point in the spread of 
democracy and free market economies.20  
The EU recognizes Georgia’s importance for the reasons listed above in addition to the 
view of it as being in the “New Europe.”21   
It should come as no surprise that Russia is opposed to eastward expansion by 
NATO. In 2004, Vladimir Socor wrote that Russia aims to isolate Georgia from NATO 
and the EU through a policy of “controlled instability” from which Russia intends to gain 
political leverage.22 The five-day war in August 2008 is a good example of this policy. 
Russia used the situation in South Ossetia to its advantage.  
The spread of democracy and by extension NATO enlargement combined with 
access to energy resources have resulted in a situation in which the interests of the NATO 
and the interests of Russia are not entirely compatible, and Georgia’s future alignment 
with NATO or Russia is likely to benefit one to the detriment of the other. Georgia’s 
future alignment with NATO or with Russia could influence further democratization in 
 
19 Vladimir Socor. “The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests” The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, on the Occasion of the NATO Summit, For A New Euro-Atlantic 
Strategy For the Black Sea Region, (2004). 
20 General James L. Jones USMC Commander United States European Command Statement Before 
the House Armed Services Committee 9 March 
2005.http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/050309-jones1.pdf (accessed 7 
January 2010). 
21 Dov Lynch. “Why Georgia Matters.” Chaillot Paper, European Union Institute for Security Studies 
N 86 (2001): 1–93, 84. 
22 Vladimir Socor. “NATO Prospects on the South Caucuses” Central Asia Caucuses Institute, School 
of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, On the Occasion of the NATO Summit,(2004). 
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Georgia and the surrounding area as well as influence the terms through which EU and 
NATO countries have access to energy resources in the Caspian Sea region.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that Georgia’s prospects for membership in 
NATO are affected by two sets of variables, one internal and one external. The two 
internal variables that affect Georgia’s NATO aspirations are Georgia’s progress on 
required reforms and the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
The first internal variable is Georgia’s progress on reforms. As a condition of 
joining NATO, Georgia is evaluated on its efforts to “democratize, develop a market 
economy, and create a professional military that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.”23 
Georgia’s government has made good progress in implementing a variety of reforms 
since the country’s Rose Revolution in 2003.24 However, its progress has been 
inconsistent at times, resulting in concern about its suitability to move forward in the 
membership process.25  
The second internal variable affecting Georgia’s NATO ambitions is perhaps the 
more contentious of the two—that is, the unresolved conflicts with the separatist regions 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which gained nominal independence (with recognition 
only by Nicaragua, Russia, and Venezuela) after armed conflict with the government of 
Georgia.26 Georgia maintains that both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are part of its 
territory based on international law.27 Conversely, South Ossetians and Abkhazians assert 
that they were folded into Georgia against their will and because of that they had a right 
 
23 Jim Nichol. Georgia (Republic) and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implications, Congressional 
Research Service. (2008), 2. 
24 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Georgia Towards Euro-Atlantic Integration. 
25 Paul Gallis. Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, Congressional Research Service. 
(2008), 20. 
26 Igor Torbakov. “South Ossetia Crisis Stokes Tension Between Russia and Georgia,”  Eurasianet, 
August 24, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav082504.shtml (accessed 27 
January 2010). 
27 Russia Georgia Conflict: Why both sides have valid points, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0819/p12s01-woeu.html (accessed 27 January 2010). 
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to declare independence when the Soviet Union collapsed.28 Georgian forces entered 
South Ossetia in August 2008 and the conflict evolved into a battle which pitted Russian 
and South Ossetian forces against those of Georgia. The status of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia was an area of concern for NATO prior to the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, but 
not necessarily to the point of being a “showstopper” for Georgian membership in NATO 
as long as Tbilisi acted in good faith to resolve the conflict. On 4 December 2009, the 
NATO heads of state and government pledged support for the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Georgia, called on Russia to reverse its recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, and encouraged concerned parties to pursue peaceful resolution of the 
conflict.29 Georgia’s ability to resolve the conflicts involving South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia is likely to have a significant impact on its future progress toward NATO 
membership.  
The external variable that affects Georgia’s NATO aspirations is Russia’s policy 
toward the country.  Russia is opposed to Georgia joining NATO and has made no 
attempts to disguise how it would view Tbilisi’s membership in the alliance. Vladimir 
Putin referred to NATO’s expansion as a direct threat. On 10 February 2007 in Munich, 
he stated,  
I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with 
the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in 
Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces 
the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is 
this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our 
western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where 
are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will 
allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote 







28 Russia Georgia Conflict: Why both sides have valid points, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0819/p12s01-woeu.html (accessed 27 January 2010). 
29 Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council, 4 December 2009, par. 13, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59699.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed 27 January 2010). 
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May 1990. He said at the time that: ‘the fact that we are ready not to place 
a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm 
security guarantee.’ Where are these guarantees? 30   
Dmitri Medvedev, the current Russian President, voiced similar concerns directly 
to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili when he warned that joining NATO would 
make the relationship between Russia and Georgia worse than it already was.31 Presently 
there does not appear to be much improvement in the relationship between Georgia and 
Russia. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on Georgia’s NATO ambitions reveals an ongoing debate as to 
whether Georgia is ready to become a member of NATO. Within the debate, there is a 
general consensus that Georgia faces a number of challenges in its bid to join NATO. 
Some argue that Georgia’s challenges are such that the country is not ready to join 
NATO, while others argue that these challenges can be overcome with direct assistance 
from NATO.  
One of the considerations for joining NATO is a country’s level of progress in 
making democratic and military reforms.32 For a former Soviet republic making military 
and political reforms is no small feat. Travis Bounds and Ryan Hendrickson write, “while 
Georgian officials have made progress towards having free and fair democratic elections, 
they have yet to meet the criteria set out by most election observation organizations.”33 
They cite irregularities reported by the OSCE, such as voter intimidation and partisan 
behavior by Georgia’s Central Election Commission, as examples of areas that need 
improvement.  The Secretary General of NATO has also publicly warned Georgia against 
 
30 Vladimir Putin. 2007. Transcript of Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on 
Security Policy, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html  (accessed 22 February 2010). 
31 Sophia Kishkovsky. “Georgia is Warned by Russia against Plans to Join NATO,” June 7, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/world/europe/07russia.html (accessed January 27 2010). 
32 Jim Nichol. Georgia (Republic) and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implications, Congressional 
Research Service. (2008), 2. 
33 Travis Bounds and Ryan Hendrickson. Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the 
Bucharest Summit. Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22, no. 1, (2009), 24. 
 9
                                                
conducting activities deemed undemocratic. In November 2007, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
said, “The imposition of Emergency Rule, and the closure of media outlets in Georgia, a 
Partner with which the Alliance has an Intensified Dialogue, are of particular concern and 
not in line with Euro-Atlantic values.”34 This warning came shortly after the Georgian 
government closed media outlets in the country and declared martial law in response to 
protests.35 
Georgia’s military reforms, while not perfect, have also been a display of 
significant progress. In this regard, Bounds and Hendrickson write that the Georgian 
government has implemented reforms to bring its military  “more closely into compliance 
with NATO standards.”36 The government plans to reduce the size of the military by 
2015 by about 30 percent from 28,666 to 18,755.37 Georgia has played an important role 
in Euro-Atlantic security by participating in operations in Kosovo and Iraq.38 Despite 
Georgia’s impressive achievements and contributions both politically and militarily, 
Bounds and Hendrickson believe that it fails to meet criteria for membership set forth in 
the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, criteria that they acknowledge have been 
disregarded on previous occasions.  
The relevance of the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement was raised by Temuri 
Yakobashvili and Jonathan Kulick of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and 
International Studies in a Black Sea Paper written for the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States. They also acknowledge that Georgia has made impressive progress in its 
internal reforms. Whereas Bounds and Henderson focused primarily on Georgian 
political and military reforms, Yakobashvili and Kulick in 2007 focused on the 
unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They argued that resolving these 
 
34 NATO. Press release. Statement by the Secretary General on the Situation in Georgia, 8 November 
2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-114e.html (accessed 7 January 2010). 
35 Tara Bahrampour. “Pro-Western Georgia Declares State of Emergency,” November 8, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/07/AR2007110700250.html (accessed 7 
January 2010). 
36 Travis Bounds and Ryan Hendrickson. Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the 
Bucharest Summit. Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22, no. 1, (2009), 20–30, 27. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 28. 
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conflicts should not be an impediment to membership because “The resolution of these 
conflicts is not entirely in Georgia’s hands, as outside powers, especially Russia, wield 
great influence. To make resolution a precondition for NATO membership would give 
Russia an effective veto over possible Georgian membership and, in all likelihood, 
encourage Moscow in its current aggressive policies.”39 Kahka Jibladze, a free-lance 
reporter in Tbilisi, agrees with the assessment of Yakobashvili and Kulick. He points out 
that Georgia’s relationship with Moscow was deteriorating as it moved closer to NATO 
membership.40 Jibladze argues that Georgia will be unable to overcome Russia’s 
influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia without direct support from NATO members.41  
Pierre Razoux  of the NATO Defence College believes that Georgia could solve 
its problems in South Ossetia and Abkhazia  by recognizing Abkhazia’s independence in 
exchange for South Ossetia’s return to solid Georgian control.42 The task of overcoming 
Russia’s influence is unlikely to be that simple.  One reason could be Russia’s feelings of 
insecurity. Andrei Tsyngankov states that Russia “ felt increasingly encircled by radical 
pro-American regimes in the former Soviet region” and the desire (by some former 
Soviet republics) to join NATO has increased Russia’s “strategic insecurity.”43  
These conditions resulted in an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy. 
Vladimir Putin expressed Russia’s concerns about NATO expansion in the former Soviet 
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of a powerful military bloc as a direct threat to the security of our country. The claim that 
this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice. National security is not based 
on promises.”44 
E. METHODS 
This thesis utilizes a qualitative and historical methodology to ascertain and 
analyze the internal and external variables that affect Georgia’s NATO prospects. 
Sources include government documents, scholarly articles and press reports. The goal is 
to assess Georgia’s prospects for membership in NATO by analyzing the domestic and 
international challenges it faces.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows; The introduction describes the thesis topic, 
research questions and importance of the research. Chapter II discusses Georgia’s Rose 
Revolution and why NATO membership is important for Georgia. Chapter III examines 
the internal factors within Georgia, primarily its progress on reforms and the situation 
with the separatist provinces. Chapter IV analyzes Russia’s opposition to Georgia’s 
NATO aspirations. Chapter V offers conclusions. 
 
44 Press Statement and Answers to Journalists, Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO 
Council, http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/04/04/1949_type82915_163150.shtml (accessed 7 January 
2010). 
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II. GEORGIA’S DECISION TO SEEK NATO MEMBERSHIP 
Georgia is one of the former Soviet republics that defines itself as being Western. 
Georgians tend to ascribe to the idea of liberal nationalism, which is a belief that 
Georgians are “first and foremost Georgian and not Soviet, and that its people were 
‘western’.”45 Predictably, such sentiments remained strong after Georgia gained its 
independence from the Soviet Union. The popular phrase “I am Georgian therefore I am 
European,”46 coined by the late Zurab Zhvania, who served as Prime Minister of Georgia 
in 2004–2005, is one such example. 
With such a perception among the population it is not surprising that Georgia, 
having gained its independence, has sought membership in the main Western security 
institutions, especially NATO. Georgia began its relationship with NATO—via the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council and The Partnership for Peace—in the early 90s. However, 
it was not until after the Rose Revolution in 2003 that Georgia’s efforts to integrate with 
Western institutions such as NATO intensified.  
The Rose Revolution was a watershed moment in Georgian history. It came about 
for a variety of reasons. From the early to mid 1990s to the early years of the new 
millennium the republics of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic 
States, had grown more authoritarian amidst electoral fraud and manipulation, which had 
become more commonplace. The situation in Georgia appeared to be moving along that 
same path until 22–23 November 2003. At that time, a series of nonviolent mass protests 
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The Rose Revolution erupted due to a combination of factors, including a poor 
economic environment, corruption, and a fragile political situation prior to the 2003 
parliamentary elections. These factors created a situation that resulted in an opportunity 
for members of the opposition.   
One observer noted that “severe economic distress … made the bulk of the 
population dissatisfied regardless of their political views.”47 To further complicate 
matters only a small elite benefited from privatization and new business startups based on 
their political connections, namely ties to the president.48 Shevardnadze also had to 
contend with an opposition that was comprised of members who had split from his own 
party, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG).49 An already unstable environment was 
made even more so for Shevardnadze due to the presence of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and pseudo independent television stations.  
The Shevardnadze government was accused of large-scale election fraud. The 
television station Rustavi-2 played a key role in supporting the protesters, as did certain 
NGOs.50  Foreign and Georgian NGOs monitored the elections and conducted exit 
polls.51 There were irregularities reported throughout the country. For example, the 
Marneuli district in southern Georgia was reported to have cast 90 percent of its votes in 
favor of the CUG while estimates of support in that region were expected to be only 60 to 
70 percent.52 Additionally, there were reports that people had voted multiple times, that 
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intimidating people inside the polling stations, among other things. 53 It appeared that the 
electoral commissions were attempting to provide Shevardnadze a parliamentary 
majority.54  
The reports of fraud led to anger on the part of the public and belief by the 
opposition that it had been cheated.55 After “ludicrous” results were reported from the 
Ajara region of the country the number of demonstrators present in the capital city, 
Tbilisi, swelled toward 100,000 people. Mikheil Saakashvili stood before the crowd and 
demanded that Shevardnadze resign.56  On 22 November 2003, while opening the new 
Parliament, Shevardnadze was confronted by Saakashvili, a key leader of the opposition, 
along with a number of supporters. Shevarnadze later resigned.57 “The Central Electoral 
Commission (CEC) disavowed the November election and the courts canceled the 
results.”58 In January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia by an 
overwhelming margin.59 The Rose Revolution was the vehicle through which 
Saakashvili came to power in Georgia.  From his predecessor he inherited a country that 
was “riddled by endemic corruption, high levels of poverty and unemployment, a 
stagnating economy, a huge external debt and a dysfunctional democratic system.”60 He 
also inherited the unresolved conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia which “deprived 
the Tbilisi Central Authorities of effective control over one fifth of Georgia’s territory.”61 
After taking power Saakashvili set out on an ambitious agenda that included instituting 
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reforms, tackling corruption, improving the economy, and most importantly  “pointing 
Georgia in the direction of the West.”62 He also pledged to regain central government 
control over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.63 Saakashvili also 
desired to integrate Georgia with the West. Obtaining membership in NATO is one of the 
main considerations in Georgian efforts to integrate with the West. 
A. WHY NATO IS IMPORTANT TO GEORGIA 
There are several reasons why NATO membership is important for Georgia. 
NATO is first and foremost a collective defense organization. With that in mind, 
obtaining membership in the Alliance would provide Georgia with a level of security. 
Membership in the alliance would provide Georgia with protection under Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, which states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, 
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area.” Since Georgia considers Russia to be a threat to its sovereignty, the 
Russian threat is a major driver behind its membership ambitions.  
Joining NATO is certainly a possibility. NATO has had an open door policy for 
membership since January 1994, in Brussels, when the Heads of State and Government 
proclaimed: 
We … wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We 
reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington 
Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position 
to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion 
 
62 Jesse David Tatum. “Democratic Transition in Georgia: Post Revolution Internal Pressures on 
Leadership,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Spring 2009): 156–171, 157. 
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that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an 
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security 
developments in the whole of Europe.64 
The Alliance’s open door policy remains in effect today. The Allied leaders recently 
reaffirmed their commitment to an open door policy. Fifteen years later, on 4 December 
2009, in Brussels, the Foreign Ministers stated that: 
In accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s door 
will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of 
our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and 
obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to 
common security and stability.”65 
Reaffirming NATO’s open door policy is important for an aspiring state such as Georgia.  
Another consideration for Georgia is the assistance on reforms provided to 
aspiring countries by NATO. The Alliance will assist countries in their efforts to make 
political and military reforms that will enable them to cooperate more effectively with 
NATO. The 1995 Study on NATO enlargement “concluded that enlargement would 
contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by 
encouraging and supporting democratic reforms.”66 On 9 December 2009, during a 
meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO 
Secretary General, referred to NATO’s support for reforms in Georgia: “NATO has been 
lending a helping hand, but it is the Georgians who ultimately have to deliver.”67 His 
reference to a delivery concerned Georgian efforts at making reforms.  
The 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement describes the factors that are considered 
during the membership process. The study points out that there is “no fixed or rigid list of 
 
64 The Process of NATO Enlargement, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030102.htm 
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(accessed 10 June 2010). 
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criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance.”68 However, prospective members 
are expected to meet certain political and military requirements prior to joining. “These 
include: a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; the fair 
treatment of minority populations; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; 
the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a 
commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.”69 In 
summary, aspiring members are “expected to meet certain political, economic and 
military criteria”70 in order to join NATO. 
The goal of membership in NATO is important for Georgia because it would 
provide a number of benefits to the country. The drive for membership in NATO 
provides Georgia with an opportunity to improve its security situation, receive assistance 
in its efforts to complete the transition from a democratizing post-Soviet state to a 
consolidated democracy, and move closer to integration with the principal Euro-Atlantic 
security institutions, NATO and the European Union. Integration in these institutions 
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III. POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN GEORGIA 
The purpose of this chapter is to remind the reader of Georgia’s progress in 
pursuing political, military, and economic reforms since the Rose Revolution in 
November 2003. It also analyzes the challenges posed by South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
autonomous separatist regions.   
A. ECONOMIC REFORMS 
Georgia has made exceptional progress in economic reforms. The numerous 
reforms enacted in Georgia since the Rose Revolution include changes to visa policies 
and business registrations. Georgia’s visa policies allow citizens of selected countries to 
stay in Georgia without a visa for up to 360 days.71  Georgia has also improved its 
business registration process by decreasing the time it takes to register from 30 days to 
one hour.72 These changes to Georgia’s visa policies and business registration process 
have probably contributed to increased growth in Foreign Direct Investment and GDP. 
Georgia has also made changes to its tax code and customs system as part of its economic 
reforms. The tax rate was initially 22 percent before it was reduced to 7 percent.73 The 
belief was that this change would decrease the tax burden on business by 5 percent of 
GDP.  The Georgian Customs System had hampered the overall economy due to rampant 
corruption. To address this issue the Georgian government simplified the system by 
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of contact between business managers and bureaucrats. In addition to battling corruption, 
the system is also more efficient. Permits are now received within 30 days and leases are 
received within 20 days.75  
These policies have contributed to an improved business climate in the country 
and have helped it to improve its economic situation. Georgia’s economic reform efforts 
have gained recognition from organizations such as the World Bank. In 2005–2006 
Georgia led the World Bank’s top ten reformer rankings on the ease of doing business. In 
a single year Georgia jumped 75 places in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” 2007 
report.76 Georgia’s economic performance in terms of ease of doing business since that 
time has remained strong and the country is currently ranked number 11 in the world 
behind the United States and the United Kingdom, among others, and in front of 
Germany and France in the 2010 rankings.77   
Recognition of Georgia’s economic performance was not limited to the World 
Bank. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also recognized 
Georgia’s economic improvement. According to the EBRD, “in 2007 real GDP growth 
was 12.4  percent—up from approximately 9.3 percent in both 2005 and 2006, and 
markedly better than 5.9 percent in 2004.”78 Georgia’s economy has been affected by the 
global slowdown, with GDP growth of 2.1 percent in 2008 and contractions of 5.9 
percent and 10.7 percent in the first and second quarters of 2009.79 Georgia is expected 
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to experience a modest recovery in 2010.80 Its recent economic troubles do not detract 
from its remarkable economic achievements in such a short time, especially in light of the 
economic distress that the rest of the world is presently experiencing.  
B. DEFENSE REFORM 
Georgia has demonstrated varying levels of performance in all of its reforms and 
its progress in defense reforms has been no different. The 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement states that prospective members will be expected to establish “appropriate 
democratic and civilian control of their defense force”81 and to demonstrate that they 
have the ability to “contribute militarily to collective defense and to the Alliance’s new 
missions.”82 In that regard, Georgia has certainly made progress.  
For example, Georgia has demonstrated that it has both the ability and the 
willingness to make contributions to NATO operations. It has troop deployment 
experience based on its participation in the NATO-led Kosovo Protection Force.83 
Georgia also gained experience operating with the U.S.-led coalition  in Iraq. At one time 
Georgia was the third largest contributor of troops.84  
Although the Iraq mission was not NATO-led, many of the coalition forces 
operating there were members of the Alliance, which allowed Georgia to gain valuable 
experience. As one observer noted, “Georgia forces in Iraq were not merely guarding 
bases – they were controlling an entire province of the country on behalf of the U.S.-led 
coalition there and were conducting full-scale combat operations, albeit with significant 
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U.S. assistance in certain areas.”85 Georgia has also recently contributed forces to the 
NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, where it has about 950 soldiers in Helmand 
Province.86 Participation in these operations demonstrates an ability and willingness to 
contribute to NATO operations and also allows Georgia to highlight its military 
modernization and training.  
Georgia’s progress to date is notable, especially when one considers the point at 
which Georgia began. Georgia’s military situation was poor when compared to other 
post-Soviet states. It had “few personnel serving in the Soviet military, and of these, even 
fewer served as officers in combat units.”87 Georgia had to “attempt to form new units 
with cast-off Soviet equipment and ammunition,” and “with relatively few experienced 
personnel to train and lead their units.”88 To further complicate matters, the Georgians 
had to fight two conflicts within their own boundaries when Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
declared independence. The improvements in the Georgian military began when it joined 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994, and noticeable progress was apparent after 
Georgia started receiving support via the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) in 
2002. It was at this time, one observer remarked, that meaningful Western assistance 
began.89   
Yet other observers remain unsupportive of Georgia’s candidacy for membership 
in NATO. They acknowledge that Georgia’s deployment experiences make it unique 
when compared to other applicants for NATO membership but hold that these 
experiences are offset by what they consider to be the limited benefits that Georgia could 
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offer to the alliance, especially in light of the 2008 war in Georgia.90 In response to 
comments on Georgia’s defeat during the war with Russia, one supporter of Georgian 
membership in NATO has argued that, 
…if defeating the Russian military with no outside assistance is a litmus 
test for NATO membership, most of NATO’s current 26 members would 
be retroactively disqualified. The whole point of collective security is to 
meet threats together.91  
It is difficult to deny that Georgia has demonstrated that it has the ability and 
willingness to make a contribution to NATO operations.  Georgia has also demonstrated 
a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures. Proof to 
that effect can be seen in Georgia’s Ministry of Defense. In 1999 Georgia’s defense 
forces had seven independent branches: the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the 
Border Guards, the Interior Troops, the Independent Assault Brigade, the Police Special 
Duties Unit, and the Special Service for the Protection of the State.92 Under this 
arrangement state control was problematic because, according to David J. Smith, an 
American member of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), which is an 
advisory committee of the U.S. Department of State, “individuals used these private 
forces as their own power bases to pursue personal agendas.”93 A failure to solve this 
issue would have certainly precluded Georgia from being able to contribute to NATO 
operations. To solve this problem, “[t]he National Guard and the Independent Assault 
Brigade have been folded into the Georgian Armed Forces within the Ministry of 
Defense. Meanwhile, the Border Guards and Police Special Duties Unit have come under 
the Interior Ministry's control.”94  
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Georgia has also improved democratic oversight of civil-military relations. 
According to a 2006 report by the International Security Advisory Board, “The role of 
Parliament in the democratic oversight of the security sector has been strengthened. … A 
civilian Minister of Defence now leads a civilian MOD, separate from the General Staff.” 
Moreover, “In December 2004 the Law on Defense of Georgia defined the roles of the 
President, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence.”95 These arrangements 
contribute to democratic and civilian control over the Georgian defense forces.  
The reforms previously mentioned did not include all the reforms that Georgia 
undertook as part of its efforts to improve its prospects for NATO membership. It should 
be understood that, although NATO is a collective defense organization, defense 
capabilities are not the sole important consideration for a prospective member. Support 
for this line of thinking can be found in what Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, then the NATO 
Secretary-General, said in a speech at Tbilisi State University in October 2007: “Contrary 
to what people may think, modernisation of the defence and security sector is not all that 
NATO is interested in.  As a matter of fact, quite the opposite is true.… When assessing 
progress in Georgia, NATO has looked, and will continue to look, at the whole reform 
picture, and not just the military dimension.”96  Georgia’s reforms were reviewed 
primarily to draw attention to the efforts that Georgia has made in this regard. 
C. POLITICAL REFORM: TRANSITIONING TO DEMOCRACY 
The picture presented by Georgia’s progress on political reforms reforms is not as 
rosy as that concerning economic reforms and defense reform. While Georgia’s economic 
reform programs have been regarded as successful as well as key defense reforms, the 
country’s political reforms remain a work in progress.  
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Some observers have stated that “genuine progress and successful state-
building”97 relative to democratic development in Georgia occurred mostly in the period 
from November 2003 to November 2007. The democratic advances in this period had 
shortcomings, as there were “clear problems with democracy in Georgia”98 during that 
time. According to Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, these problems included 
“[t]he constitutional amendments, the emergence of a one-party system with strong ties 
between the ruling party and the state, a less-free media climate, the government’s 
willingness to manipulate the election law, and its persistent tendency to cut democratic 
corners in order to expedite its legislative reforms.”99 Several of these pre-2007 
problems, including the one-party system and the troubled media climate, persist. 
D. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE GEORGIAN CONSTITUTION 
Critical observers have raised a number of issues associated with the Georgian 
constitution that was adopted on 5 February 2004. First among those issues is the way in 
which it was approved. Some observers argue that it was rushed through parliament 
without an opportunity for “public input or review” during the two weeks between 
Saakashvili’s election and when he officially took office.100 “Members of parliament 
were reportedly coerced to support the amendments.”101  
Two amendments in particular drew a large amount of criticism. The amendment 
establishing the post of prime minister allowed for this person to be appointed by the 
president and approved by the parliament. This procedure has been viewed as 
unsatisfactory, owing to the domination of the parliament by Saakashvili and his 
followers. The second amendment that drew criticism allowed the president to dissolve 
parliament if it “failed to express confidence in a newly-appointed government on three 
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successive occasions or if it failed to approve the state budget.”102 This procedure has 
been deplored as giving excessive power to the president. Critics charged that the 
amendments were “undemocratic” and pushed “private and party interests at the expense 
of state interests” and “gave the executive branch the power to bulldoze through their 
decisions irrespective of the will of Parliament.”103  
Some observers hold that the executive branch has acquired too much power, 
while others maintain that there are benefits to allowing the executive to wield immense 
power. The latter argue that the decision to concentrate power in the hands of the 
president is not entirely bad because “[t]he strengthening of presidential powers and 
weakening of those of the parliament has had both positive and negative consequences 
for the country.”104 One of the positive results, for example, is that “the broader 
executive powers allowed the government to drastically reduce redundancies and 
improved its ability to maintain financial order.”105  
The Georgian Constitution has been amended five times since 2004. Some of the 
changes diminished the power of the president, while others increased his control. For 
example, a change in 2006 limited the president’s authority to appoint and dismiss judges 
while another change in 2008 gave him the power to dismiss the justice, interior, and 
defense ministers.106 The Georgian Constitution was only one of several factors that 
provided the president with significant authority and power. He also maintained power 
through his party, which dominated and continues to dominate parliament, and through 
his media advantage over the opposition.  
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E. ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE AND MANIPULATION OF ELECTION 
LAWS 
Elections in Georgia are freer than at any time in the country’s history.  In 2006, 
Lincoln Mitchell stated that, “fair elections are now the rule.”107 Three years later he 
updated his assessment with the comment that “The primary area where democratic 
advances have been made in Georgia since the Rose Revolution is in elections.”108 Yet, 
problems remain that serve as a hindrance to Georgian democratic development. Among 
those problems are one-party dominance, the manipulation of election laws, the great 
power vested in the president via the constitution, and the legislative process. These 
problems collectively cast a negative light over Georgia’s democratic development. More 
importantly these issues potentially weaken Georgia’s credibility as a candidate for 
NATO membership.  
Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) has been the sole party in power 
since the first elections were held in Georgia in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. The 
UNM still dominates the parliament based on the number of seats that are held by its 
membership. During the elections held in 2004 and 2008 members of the UNM were 
hand picked by Georgian President Saakashvili, to whom they remain loyal. The loyalty 
afforded to Saakashvili from members of his party in Parliament provides him with 
significant influence and power over the direction of his country, which in itself is not 
necessarily bad. However, it becomes an issue when the president does not have to face 
any dissent from within the government.  
It is not uncommon for one party to dominate various branches of government in 
a democracy. An area of concern in Georgia is the perceived lack of a distinction between 
the ruling party and the government.  The lack of “effort to strengthen the distinctions 
between ruling party and government”109 by the UNM has led some observers to point to 
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it as a reason behind Georgia’s troubled democratic development. Party membership or 
support from the party “is still viewed as a prerequisite to any position of power.”110 The 
UNM leadership also considers itself to be “the only democratizing force in Georgia and 
has openly questioned the need for opposition from outside the UNM.”111  When 
combined with changes made to the Constitution that “effectively removed many of the 
checks and balances in the political system and allowed for a rule by presidential decree 
rather than passing legislation through a parliamentary process,”112 the result is the 
appearance of a one-party state. Repressed dissent in Parliament, a lack of distinctions 
between the ruling party and the government, and the ability to rule by presidential 
decree are not ideal characteristics for a state seeking to further its democratic 
development.   
The danger posed by one-party dominance was recognized by a group of 
Georgian intellectuals during the first half of Saakashvili’s initial term. This group 
published an open letter to Saakashvili on 14 October 2004:  
Mr. President 
Almost one year has passed since the famous developments of October-
November 2003. The anniversary of ‘the rose revolution’ gives us a 
handle to analyze the ongoing processes, as well as to judge on the 
achievements or mistakes of the authorities.  
Since 1990 the Georgian society stands a good chance of establishing as a 
unity of free citizens. For the first time during past years the country has 
the authorities, which enjoy support of a significant part of the population. 
At the same time, both the Government and the Parliament of Georgia are 
functioning under conditions of absence of well-organized political 
opposition, which has a serious influence on the public-political processes. 
Under such circumstances, the President, the executive government and 
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the ruling party should assume greater responsibility to protect the key 
attributes of the country, such as freedom of speech and political 
pluralism.  
Unfortunately, alarming developments in Georgian politics made us to 
send this appeal to you – the President of the country and unilateral leader 
of the ruling party [National Movement]. Intolerance towards people with 
different opinions is being planted in Georgian politics and in other 
spheres of social life (business, education, science, culture, sport). Leaders 
and officials of the ruling party constantly use the labels introduced at 
dawn of establishment of Georgian democracy, in the eighties of last 
century, such as: “the enemy of the nation, traitor, the fifth column,” etc. 
The recent political debates conducted in the Parliament can clearly 
confirm this. The disease, which split the Georgian society 15 years ago 
and led the country to a civil war, has resurfaced. We are extremely 
concerned, particularly over the fact that in your recent public speeches 
there are more and more humiliating and insulting statements towards the 
opponents. 
Mr. President 
It is a dangerous illusion, that by using these forms of pressure on the 
people with different opinion, the authorities will manage to consolidate 
the society in order to implement necessary reforms in the country. 
Attempts to establish an intellectual dictatorship and mono-opinion will 
lead the country not to prompt reforms, but to an authoritarian rule and 
stagnation. The freedom of expression of alternative opinion and 
discussion is not only a cornerstone of stable, democratic development of 
the country, but also protects the authorities against making hasty, 
unprepared decisions. Planting aggressive and insulting manners into 
debate and discussions, as well as ignorance of fundamental human rights, 
against the background of difficult social-economic problems, will not 
lead to the society’s consolidation. Instead, the political opposition may 
transform into into severe personal confrontation. The opponents of the 
Georgian state always managed to profit by this factor. We have witnessed 
such facts in our recent history.  
Mr. Saakashvili 
You, as the President of Georgia and the Leader of the ruling party, are 
especially responsible for establishing the normal political environment in 




                                                
catastrophic consequences for Georgia.  We call on you to use all the 
existing levers to avoid the development of undesirable processes in the 
country.113 
Actions by the UNM long after the above letter was written to President 
Saakashvili suggest that the “absence of a well-organized opposition,” a lack of  
“political pluralism,” “intolerance toward people with different opinions,” and the use of 
“labels” such as “the enemy of the nation, traitor, the fifth column,”114 to keep the 
opposition locked out of power remain the norm and help in part to explain how the 
UNM continues to maintain its dominance over Georgian politics. 
For example, prior to elections in 2006 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili 
complained about the lack of an opposition in a speech to the European Parliament.  
Perhaps one of my biggest regrets to date, however, is the fact that 
Georgia still does not have a robust and constructive opposition. …I 
can only hope that Georgia's opposition parties will become more 
vigorous, as well as more responsible and more competent, testing the 
government, and one day (but not that soon) prevail in open and fair 
elections. We have certainly established a political and legal environment 
in which this can happen – now they must take the next step.115   
More recently, during municipal elections held during Summer 2010 the use of 
labels such as “enemy of the nation, traitor, and fifth column” were modified and used 
against the opposition.  This resulted in them being “intimidated to some extent, and 
thrown onto the defensive by efforts to label them as Russian agents.”116  
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These events show that some Georgian citizens were perceptive about the actions 
of  the government and arguably demonstrated a level of prescience related to the risks of 
one-party domination. They evidently did not foresee how the UNM would use additional 
tactics to maintain one-party dominance.  
Elections in Georgia from the Rose Revolution to the present have been 
considered free. However, they have not been very competitive. Shortly after the Rose 
Revolution, elections were uncompetitive because a strong opposition had failed to 
emerge; but that is only a “partial explanation.”117 The major reason that elections have 
been uncompetitive is that the UNM has “manipulated elections in very clever, and legal, 
ways to ensure victory.”118  
The UNM manipulated election laws to increase its probability of winning on the 
local and national levels. The changes made to election laws for the October 2006 local 
elections were “viewed by the opposition and many independent civic organizations as an 
effort to ensure a large majority for the UNM in local government councils throughout 
Georgia, most critically in Tbilisi.”119 There is evidence to support their views. 
Parliament passed a law during the spring of 2006 that “called for a mixed system for 
selecting the Tbilisi city council.”120 This new system would prevent candidates who 
were popular but not affiliated with the UNM from getting elected by mandating that the 
Tbilisi city council be drawn partially from a party list and partially from a multi-member 
system with the winner getting all the seats in particular districts.121 The result was the 
UNM gaining 92 percent of the seats while garnering only 67 percent of the vote.122 
Additionally, the new law called for the Mayor of Tbilisi “to be selected by and from the 
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newly elected council members.”123 This provision is not in line with Saakashvili’s 
demands before the Rose Revolution when he was a member of the opposition. In 
addition to ensuring that the UNM maintained dominance in government, preventing the 
opposition from winning the job as mayor of Tbilisi allowed Saakashvili to protect his 
presidency from a potential competitor. The position of mayor of Tbilisi is visible and 
important. In addition to Tbilisi being the “cultural, political, and economic capital” of 
Georgia, it is also home to nearly half of the country’s population.   
After the UNM’s local victories the party turned its attention to national elections 
for Parliament and the office of the President. Again the UNM resorted to manipulation 
of election laws. Initially parliamentary elections were scheduled to occur in 2008 and 
presidential elections in 2009, but the Parliament “altered the constitution so that the 
president and parliament would be elected together.”124 The opposition wanted elections 
to be held in accordance with the constitution. To do so would allow them an opportunity 
to become a check on Saakashvili because his party was losing support at the time.125 
Saakashvili went on to win the presidential contest on 5 January 2008 with 53 percent of 
the vote. His next closest competitor, opposition candidate Levan Gachechiladze, earned 
only 25 percent of the vote.126  
The parliamentary elections were held in May 2008 and the UNM won 59 percent 
of the vote, which earned the party 119 seats. The United Opposition led by former 
presidential candidate Levan Gachechiladze earned only 17 percent of the vote and 17 
seats.127 UNM victories in the parliament allowed Saakashvili to maintain a 
constitutional majority, and avoid any checks on his authority as a “super executive.”128 
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It also preserved the status quo in Georgia. The decision to change the order of the 
elections was key because it allowed the UNM to ride Saakashvili’s coat tails to victory.  
Oddly enough, electoral manipulation may not have been necessary. Lincoln 
Mitchell wrote, “One reason these electoral manipulations are so surprising is that they 
not only are somehow undemocratic, but are so politically unnecessary for Saakashvili 
and his party.  Losing a few seats in the local legislatures, or even the national parliament 
would not significantly hurt the government. It would more likely show its strength, as 
even if the playing field were uneven in favor of the opposition, the government would 
still win.”129 There is truth in the preceding statement because the UNM has many 
advantages over the opposition. Its success in maintaining power is also based on the 
support of the media, which in many recognized circles is not considered to be free. 
F. LACK OF MEDIA FREEDOM  
Questions about media freedom in Georgia have been raised by non-governmental 
organizations, the Georgian political opposition, and scholars. The Georgian Constitution 
states,  “The mass media shall be free. The censorship shall be impermissible.” It also 
states that “Neither the state nor particular individuals shall have the right to monopolise 
mass media or means of dissemination of information.”130  
Having such freedoms codified into law makes it easy to see why Georgia “used 
to get the best marks in the Caucasus on its respect for press freedom.”131 Legally (on 
paper that is) the press in Georgia is freer than in neighboring countries. However, the 
relationship between the media and the government is not conducive to democracy.  
NGOs such as Freedom House and Human Rights Watch have raised questions 
about the level of media freedom in Georgia. Freedom House, in 2009, rated media 
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freedom in Georgia as “partly free” based on a score of 60 out of 100.132 Freedom 
House’s methodology considers lower scores better scores. It is worth noting that a score 
of 61 would have resulted in Georgia’s rating falling from the middle category of “partly 
free” to the lowest category of “not free.” 
The issues cited by Freedom House include increased government control over 
the media, the government’s refusal to allow members of the parliamentary opposition to 
sit on the Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC), the government’s 
restrictions on analytical and talk shows, and reports of physical threats and assaults 
against members of the media.133 In addition to several of the issues raised by Freedom 
House, Human Rights Watch also cites a lack of television broadcasting outside of state-
owned stations and pro-government television stations like Rustavi-2 and Imedi.134 
Human Rights Watch also points out that there is a lack of transparency in media 
ownership.135  
Although Georgia has a vast amount of print media, problems with televised 
media receive the most attention because the majority of Georgian citizens receive their 
information from television. The situation with the Imedi television station is of interest 
because it suggests a willingness on the part of the government to silence its critics. Imedi 
was once the most popular of three privately owned stations in Georgia. In November 
2007 it was closed by Georgian authorities after it broadcast footage of police using force 
to break up a group of protesters who were calling for the resignation of President 
Saakashvili.136 When Imedi returned to the air, the tone of its contents was such that it 
was referred to as “Rustavi 3, after the pro-government Rustavi-2.”137  
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The lack of a press that is free to provide a diversity of ideas and positions is not 
conducive to democratic development. Yet, somehow despite significant setbacks and 
government interference, the media in Georgia maintains the trust of nearly half of the 
population.138 An unfortunate side effect of this trust is that it contributes to the UNM’s 
ability to influence perceptions in the country and maintain control. It thus hinders the 
development of a robust and responsible democratic opposition. 
Georgia’s efforts at democratization have come a long way since 2003. On that 
point there is general agreement among observers of politics in Georgia. However, that 
does not mean that Tbilisi can rest on its laurels, especially since it desires NATO 
membership. The issues that Tbilisi is facing may be viewed as growing pains associated 
with its drive toward democratization. Other post-Soviet states, some of which are 
members of NATO, have also had to overcome issues and challenges as they made 
democratic transitions. The Georgian government must continue to make efforts to 
improve its level of democratic development. As mentioned earlier, the level of 
democratic development of a prospective NATO member is an important membership 
consideration. 
Oddly enough, this was not always the case. NATO in the past allowed states to 
become (or to remain) members that were not considered to be democratic states. 
Portugal, Turkey, and Greece are examples of allies that have not always been 
democracies while members of the Alliance.  
When the Alliance was formed, Portugal was governed by a dictatorship 
little different from that in Spain. … Similarly, when Greece was ruled by 
a military junta in 1967–74 and when Turkey was governed by the 
military on various occasions (1960–61, 1971–73, and 1980–83), there 
was never any question of refusing to conduct Alliance business with the 
nondemocratic regimes or of expelling these countries from the 
Alliance.”139 These nations were allowed to become or remain NATO 
members because of perceived security requirements. During the Cold 
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War, democratization was not as vital a criterion for membership as 
military strength or geostrategic location.  
Threat perceptions, however, have been drastically reduced since the collapse of the 
Soviet empire. Evidently, the Allies now feel freer to make democratization a 
requirement for membership.140  
That means that in the contemporary environment democratization is a major 
consideration. To increase the complexity of the situation, a prospective member cannot 
join the North Atlantic Alliance without the unanimous consent of all members. At 
present it is unlikely that all Alliance members would vote to admit Georgia into the 
Alliance, and not only because questions about its democratic development remain. As a 
result, Georgia will have to continue to strive toward improving the freedom of the 
media, leveling the playing field for the opposition, and increasing the distinctions 
between the UNM party and the state.  
The situation is not as dire as it appears because Georgia does maintain some 
support from key members of the Alliance, including the United States, for its efforts to 
democratize. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden spoke before the Georgian Parliament in July 
2009: “Your Rose Revolution will only be complete when government is transparent, 
accountable, and fully participatory; when issues are debated inside this chamber, not 
only out on the streets; when you fully address key constitutional issues regarding the 
balance of power between the parliament and the executive branch, and leveling your 
electoral playing field; when the media is totally independent and professional, providing 
people the information to make informed decisions, and to hold their government 
accountable for the decisions it makes; when the courts are free from outside influence 
and the rule of law is firmly established, and when the transfer of power occurs through 
peaceful, constitutional, and democratic processes, not on the street.”141 
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Democracy in Georgia is not perfect, and much work remains if it is to progress 
from being considered a “young and immature democracy”142 toward becoming a 
consolidated democracy. Efforts to improve Georgia’s performance concerning 
democratization would go a long way toward increasing the country’s attractiveness and 
improving its prospects for membership.  If Georgia fails to make progress on 
democratization, there is a distinct possibility that its prospects for membership in the 
North Atlantic Alliance will remain in limbo for the foreseeable future.  
G. SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA 
The troubled status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may represent the most 
formidable challenge of the many that Tbilisi must overcome in Georgia’s bid for NATO 
membership. The central government lacks control of these regions, which are both 
within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia. Russia’s deepening relationship 
with South Ossetia and Abkhazia presents a major challenge for Tbilisi.  
Tbilisi’s difficult relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia began as an internal 
issue during the last days of the Soviet Union. The pending breakup of the Soviet Union 
led to aspirations for independence not only in Georgia but in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as well. The aspirations for independence among the three parties developed 
into a situation that was ripe to be exploited by Russia in a manner that was detrimental 
to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and especially Georgia.  
South Ossetia was the first of the two provinces to seek independence. In 
November 1989 the authorities in what was then the oblast of South Ossetia unilaterally 
declared South Ossetia an autonomous republic.143 They also declared their intent to 
unite with North Ossetia, which is a part of Russia.144 The response from the Georgian 
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authorities was to call the declaration by the South Ossetians unconstitutional.145 
Undeterred, in September 1990 the South Ossetian parliament “adopted a declaration on 
sovereignty and republican status.” South Ossetia held its own parliamentary elections in 
December 1990, after having boycotted the Georgian elections one month earlier.146 The 
response from Tbilisi was to abolish South Ossetian autonomy and to deploy national 
guard and police units whose task was to restore order. This resulted in a civil war that 
lasted until June 1992.147  The war ended after a cease-fire agreement authorized the 
introduction of Russian peacekeepers.148  
Unlike the South Ossetians, who are separated  by an artificial boundary from 
their ethnic kin in North Ossetia, the Abkhazians as an ethnic group are consolidated in 
one territory.149 This circumstance may be a contributing factor behind what some 
observers have referred to as an “unequivocal … desire for independence from Russia 
and Georgia.” This is a contrast to the South Ossetians, who have not made it clear 
whether they want independence, or to merge with North Ossetia and become a part of 
Russia. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been subjected to virtual annexation by 
Russia, particularly since August 2008. 
The Abkhazians asserted their independence from Georgia with a formal 
declaration in 1990, which was annulled by the Georgian authorities.150 In February 
1992, authorities in Georgia restored the 1921 pre-Soviet constitution, an act which 
Abkhazians viewed as an attack on their autonomous status. This led them to declare 
independence once again.151 Tbilisi responded as it had regarding South Ossetia by 
 
145 Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud. “Living with Non-Recognition: State- and Nationbuilding in 
South Caucasian Quasi-States,” Europe Asia Studies, NUPI (2008), 488. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Miriam Lanskoy and Giorgi Areshidze. “Georgias Year of Turmoil.” Journal of Democracy, 
(October 2008), 156. 
149 Shireen T. Hunter. “Border, Conflict, and Security in the Caucasus.” SAIS Review, (2006), 117. 
150 Shireen T. Hunter. “Border, Conflict, and Security in the Caucasus.” SAIS Review, (2006), 117. 
151 Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud. “Living with Non-Recognition: State- and Nationbuilding in 
South Caucasian Quasi-States.” Europe Asia Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (2008), 
486. 
 39
                                                
sending in troops to restore order.152 Georgian troops initially had success,  but they were 
pushed back by Abkhazian and Russian “volunteers” who reclaimed the capital, 
Sukhumi.153 In April 1994, Georgian and Abkhazian authorities signed a declaration that 
was originally brokered by the UN in July 1993. This declaration committed them to 
strictly observe a cease-fire and to allow for the return of displaced persons.154 The two 
sides signed another agreement with Moscow one month later that established a 
“demilitarized zone along the banks of the Inguri River—which divides Abkhazia from 
the rest of Georgia—to be overseen by a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
force that was overwhelmingly Russian.”155  
The drives for independence from Georgia by South Ossetia and Abkhazia are 
significant in that the ensuing conflicts during the early 1990s allowed Russia to gain and 
maintain military footholds within Georgia via “peacekeeping” in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. From these footholds Russia has been able to deepen its ties with both quasi-
states with the overall affect being denial of sovereignty to Georgia.  
Russia’s grip on South Ossetia and Abkhazia has increased significantly since the 
August 2008 war. On 12 August 2008, Russia and Georgia agreed to a cease-fire 
brokered by President Sarkozy of France.156 Less than a month later, a Russian defense 
official declared that Moscow planned to deploy 7,600 troops to the breakaway regions. 
This represented double the number of forces there prior to the war.157 Less than a week 
after this announcement concerning the additional forces, Russia signed military 
cooperation agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia for a term of 49 years with an 
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option to extend for five-year increments after the initial term.158  The agreements 
authorized Russia to build bases and position troops in the two regions.  
According to the International Crisis Group, official estimates place 3,800 
Russian troops in South Ossetia, with most located in Tskhinvali, Java, and 
Kanchaveti.159 The bases are situated in elevated positions on key terrain that some 
observers believe will allow Russia to dominate substantial parts of Georgia while being 
positioned only 50 kilometers from Tbilisi.160 The positioning of these troops also poses 
a threat to the east-west highway that was temporarily seized by Russian troops during 
the August 2008 war.161 Georgian officials believe that the location of these troops would 
allow Russia to accomplish in an hour what took them days in August 2008. There is a 
comparable number of troops stationed in Abkhazia, with estimates ranging from 4,000 
to 5,000. In Abkhazia, the Russian forces provide Moscow with options to maintain 
influence over Georgia and to project naval power useful for confronting other threats. 
Russia plans to build a Black Sea naval base in the town of Ochamchire that will serve as 
a hedge should it lose its access to the strategic and historic base of Sevastopol, which is 
home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.162  Russia also positioned its S300 advanced 
missile system in Abkhazia in August 2010.163 
One of the declared reasons for these actions is the oft-repeated claim by Russia, 
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia that Georgia continues to pose a threat to the separatist 
regions and is engaged in an arms build up in preparation for a resumption of hostilities. 
The Georgian government has denied these accusations, and its denials are supported by 
statements from the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) observers 
who conduct regular patrols between the entities as well as by a drastic cut of more than 
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50 percent in the Georgian military budget for 2010.164 Both the lack of activity and the 
defense budget cutback are supportive of Georgia’s response and suggest that the claims 
of the other parties are baseless.  
While the deepening military relationship between Russia and the two breakaway 
regions is certainly a cause for concern, it does not tell the whole story. Russia has also 
been deepening its economic ties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In addition to the 
military support provided, both regions are heavily dependent on Russia for financial aid 
and investment. Russia provides nearly half of Abkhazia’s state budget of $128 million 
and accounts for 99 percent of its foreign investment while also serving as its largest 
trading partner.165 Russia provided approximately $137 million of the $140 million South 
Ossetian budget in 2010, and Russia is also the largest trading partner for South 
Ossetia.166  The “unstable security situation, underdeveloped legal framework and high 
level of corruption” in South Ossetia have resulted in almost no private investment in the 
country.167 Despite their varying levels of support from Russia, the most notable 
similarity between the two regions is their reliance on Russia for economic and political 
survival.  
The prospects of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for either true independence or 
reintegration with Georgia are doubtful in the foreseeable future. One factor is the 
problem of their recognition by Russia. Both countries were recognized as independent 
from Georgia by Russia on 26 August 2008 via an announcement by Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev:  
The Presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, based on the results of the 
referendums conducted and on the decisions taken by the Parliaments of 
the two republics, appealed to Russia to recognize the state sovereignty of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Federation Council and the State Duma 
voted in support of those appeals. A decision needs to be taken based on 
the situation on the ground. Considering the freely expressed will of the 
Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples and being guided by the provisions of the 
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UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
Governing Friendly Relations Between States, the CSCE Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975 and other fundamental international instruments, I signed 
Decrees on the recognition by the Russian Federation of South Ossetia's 
and Abkhazia's independence.168  
Russia’s recognition was followed by that of Nicaragua169 and Venezuela170 in 
September 2009 and by the small island nation of Nauru in December 2009.171 
The recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence by Russia was 
met with condemnation from NATO countries.  The NATO Allies declared that 
“Russia’s decision violates the many UN Security Council resolutions it has endorsed 
regarding Georgia’s territorial integrity, and is inconsistent with the fundamental OSCE 
principles on which stability in Europe is based.”172 The NATO Allies continue to 
support Georgia’s sovereignty by recognizing both regions as being part of Georgia.173  
The lack of recognition by most governments left South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
with little choice but to improve their ties with Russia, especially since neither entity 
wished to be reconciled with Georgia. There is also the issue of economic dependency, 
particularly in the case of South Ossetia, which is not economically viable without 
Russian aid. This situation does not bode well for Georgia’s NATO membership 
ambitions.  Russia’s involvement in the breakaway regions puts the Allies in a position in 
which they must determine if the prospect of bringing Georgia further along in the 
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process for membership is worth the risk of being forced to confront Russia, which has 
drawn a clear line in the sand in the South Caucasus based on its actions in the region. 
For Georgia, the challenges associated with regaining control over the 
autonomous republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been and will remain severe 
even with support from most of the member states of the United Nations. Russia has no 
incentive to change course regarding Georgia and the breakaway regions. Increased 
involvement by Moscow and the accompanying tightening relationships with South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia make an already difficult situation for Georgia worse by 
introducing yet another roadblock before the leadership in Tbilisi. The effect of this 
roadblock is diminished prospects for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.  Russia 
is the primary beneficiary of this state of affairs. Moscow’s earlier attempts to manipulate 
Georgia via economic leverage failed because Georgia was able to circumvent the 
pressure. Russia has found through the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia a 
functional strategy that will be difficult for Georgia to surmount. The current situation 
enables Russia to manipulate Tbilisi and may outright prevent Georgia from improving 
its NATO membership prospects. Russia has positioned itself in a way that allows it to 
raise the cost not only for Georgia, should it decide to try to forcibly reclaim control of 
the breakaway regions, but also for NATO should it choose to grant Georgia membership 
in the Alliance. Doing so might force the Alliance to confront Russia, which has firmly 
planted its flag in Georgia (that is, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and part of Georgia 
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IV. RUSSIAN INTERESTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze why Georgia is important to Russia, why 
Russia is against Georgia joining NATO, and how Moscow has attempted to influence 
Georgia and prevent it from joining NATO.   
A. RUSSIA’S INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 
The South Caucasus, which includes Georgia, is important to the Russian 
leadership. Russians have described it as being vital to their national interests on multiple 
occasions over many years in conjunction with expressions of concern about Western 
encroachment in the region. Russian interests in the region have not changed much over 
time. What has changed are the methods that Russia has used to leverage its influence, 
especially in Georgia. The analysis in this thesis begins with 2000 because in that year 
Vladimir Putin was elected President and began to reassert Russian strength. 
In 2000, Scott Jones wrote that there was a new great game in the Caucasus with 
Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Certain Western countries as players.174 This great game 
includes governments and multinational corporations competing for pipelines, markets, 
and political influence. One of the chief attractions in the area is its large oil and gas 
reserves.175 Russia’s interests in the region in 2000 were primarily related to maintaining 
access to these resources. In addition to the challenge posed by other governments and 
multinational corporations, Russia’s National Security Concept in 2000 also listed 
NATO’s eastward expansion, the “possible appearance of foreign military bases and 
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and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external 
borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States” as possible 
threats to Russia’s national security.176  
In 2002, Vitaly V. Naumkin of the International Center for Strategic and Political 
Studies in Moscow showed that not much had changed when he succinctly wrote that the 
South Caucasus was of interest to Russia for, security and economic reasons. He listed 
five factors that are tied to Russia’s security or economic interests, which mirrored the 
National Security Concept in 2000:  
 It borders on the North Caucasus, which generates grave internal threats to 
Russia’s security.  
 It separates Russia from its major southern partners, Turkey and Iran. It 
has a high level of instability, with some serious unsettled internal 
conflicts.  
 There is potential for conflict in relations between South Caucasian states 
and with their southern neighbors.  
 The states of the region play an important role in the development of the 
mineral resources of the Caspian Basin.  
 Global and regional powers, and other states as well, are paying increasing 
attention to the region.177  
In early 2007, R. Craig Nation wrote that, “Russia has important investments and 
economic interests at stake in the region. Its commitment to the exploitation of Caspian 
basin oil and natural gas potential is considerable. The perception of U.S. and EU 
encroachment designed to detach the region from Russia and attach it to a putative Euro-
Atlantic community is viewed as an assault on vital national interests.”178 
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In August 2008, after the war in Georgia, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev 
presented the five principles of Russia’s foreign policy. Numbers four and five are most 
relevant to Russia’s interests in Georgia. In describing principle number 4 President 
Medvedev stated that, “protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they 
may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will 
be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community 
abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed 
against us.”179 In speaking of principle number five, he stated, “as is the case of other 
countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are 
home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together 
as friends and good neighbours. We will pay particular attention to our work in these 
regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.”180  
It is not unusual for a country to declare its intentions to protect its citizens and 
businesses interests abroad. The principle that was the most interesting and that garnered 
the most attention was principle number five, which is surprising since it is nothing more 
than a restatement of a position that Russia has held for some time.  
The information cited above suggests that Russia’s core interests have not 
changed much since 2000. Of Russia’s numerous interests in the Caucasus four stand out: 
control of energy resources, prevention of Western encroachment, protection of Russian 
citizens, and maintenance of the area as a buffer zone. All four of these issues are related 
in one way or another to the security of the state or to economic interests, which have 
been fairly consistent since 2000. These issues place Georgian interests at odds with 
Russian interests. 
An examination of Russia’s political and economic actions in the South Caucasus 
suggests that Moscow was attempting to implement a foreign policy that would increase 
its influence in the South Caucasus in ways that would address what it perceived to be 
threats to its security and economic interests. It is also clear that the Soviet legacy in the 
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region, territorial gerrymandering, and economic dependence derived from 70 years in 
the Soviet economy provided Moscow with means by which it could increase its 
influence and protect its interests in what had once been constituent elements of the 
USSR. Moscow pursued these interests with varying degrees of success. 
B. RUSSIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH GEORGIA 
1. Introduction 
Russia’s relationship with Georgia has been more problematic than its 
relationships with the other two states in the South Caucasus. Between 1999 and 2008 
Russia attempted to increase its influence in Georgia both politically and economically. 
Georgia’s goals were not compatible with Russia’s goals in the South Caucasus, 
especially from the Russian perspective. Among the many Russian grievances with 
Georgia were its efforts to “forge closer ties with the USA and the EU, as well as the 
country’s drive to join NATO, its reluctance to support Russia in its struggle with the 
Chechen insurrection and the Georgian government’s insistence on closure of the Russian 
military bases on Georgian soil.”181 Moscow’s efforts to draw Georgia back into its orbit 
were unsuccessful and even counterproductive.  
2. Russian Military Bases 
The Tbilisi government has long desired the closure of the Russian military bases 
on Georgian soil. The Russian government has retained the bases because it regards them 
as important for power projection and maintaining influence in the region. The 
contradictory desires of Tbilisi and Moscow regarding Russian bases in Georgia have 
remained one of many sources of friction between the two countries.  
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3. Chechen Support 
At the beginning of the second Russo-Chechen war, in 1999, Georgia allowed 
Chechen refugees to settle in the Pankisi Gorge with Georgian citizens of Chechen origin. 
This prompted Russian President Boris Yeltsin to request Georgian assistance in attacks 
against Chechen rebels, a request which Tbilisi rejected.182 The Georgian government 
allowed a Chechen Representation Office and Information Center to operate in Tbilisi in 
addition to the publication of a Chechen newspaper assisted by the Association of the 
Georgian Free Press.183 The Chechen newspaper and the Chechen Representation Office 
and Information Center were of benefit to the cause of Chechen independence and made 
Georgia appear supportive of this cause; and this was not pleasing to the leadership in 
Russia. The Russian leadership considered the Pankisi Gorge to be a safe haven from 
which Chechen militants launched attacks into Chechnya against Russian forces in 
addition to terrorizing the local population.184  
Russia and Georgia attempted to solve the issue by signing a security agreement 
in June 2000, but failed to achieve a major breakthrough in bilateral relations. Russia 
instituted a visa control regime against Georgia that was announced in November 2000 
and scheduled to take effect in December 2000.185 The visa control regime was followed 
by Russian threats in the summer of 2002 to send troops into the Pankisi Gorge unless 
Georgia took measures against Chechen fighters believed by Russia to be operating from 
the area. Georgia did so by deploying 1,000 soldiers to the area.186 The 1,000 troops sent 
to the Pankisi Gorge by Tbilisi did little to assure Moscow, however, In September 2002, 
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Charter, Moscow had the right to conduct attacks in Georgia to protect Russia from 
Chechen insurgents.187  The two sides called for a truce in October 2002 and Georgia 
extradited several Chechen rebels to Russia.188 
4. American Military Presence 
The presence of American soldiers on Georgian soil led to unease on the part of 
the Russian leadership. In April 2002, the United States Department of Defense 
announced that it would begin the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). The 
program was intended to enhance the counter-terrorism capabilities of Georgia and to 
address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge.189 It was designed to provide staff training and 
tactical training, along with a transfer of military equipment.190 The governments of the 
United States and Georgia tried to lower Russian anxiety by emphasizing “that any such 
equipment will be provided for the four battalions and one company only for the duration 
of their training and is not intended to be a rearmament program for the entire Georgian 
army.”191 Russia was informed by Georgia that “the U.S. advisors were training 
Georgian soldiers outside Tbilisi and had played no role in the Pankisi Gorge 
Operations,” but this was considered to be of little assurance for the Russian 
government.192 Georgia also granted U.S. military personnel visa free entry into the 
country, legal exemptions from prosecution, and permission to carry weapons off duty, as 
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well as overfly rights.193  This military cooperation agreement between the United States 
and Georgia put U.S. military personnel on par with diplomats and granted far more 
freedom than was accorded to Russian troops stationed in Georgia at the time. This 
circumstance also increased tension with Russia.194  
C. ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE VIA ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
MECHANISMS 
Despite the tension between the two countries, Russia continued its efforts to 
increase its influence in Georgia through purchases in the Georgian energy and finance 
sector.  In July 2003, the Georgian government and Gazprom signed a memorandum on 
strategic cooperation for twenty-five years that would provide Russian natural gas to 
Georgian customers as well as upgrade the pipeline in Georgia.195 In August 2003, RAO 
Unified Energy Systems (UES), a Russian electricity company purchased a 75 percent 
stake in Georgia’s AES (Applied Energy Services)-Telasi joint venture from AES Silk 
Road in a deal that gave UES a tremendous share of Georgia’s domestic electricity 
market.196 In 2005, Russia’s Vneshtorgbank bought 51 percent of the shares of one of the 
top banks in Georgia, United Georgia Bank.197   
The relations between the two countries became hostile in September 2006 after 
four Russian military officers were arrested in Tbilisi for espionage and accused of 
obtaining information related to Georgia’s defensive capabilities, strategies for NATO 
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integration, energy, security, and political parties.198 The Russian government responded 
two days later by recalling its ambassador to Georgia and announcing a partial evacuation 
of Russian personnel and their families, citing a growing threat to their security.199 On 2 
October 2006 the Georgian government freed the Russian officers that had been 
detained.200 Within hours of the release Russia “suspended all railway, highway, 
maritime, and air transport, as well as postal services, between Russia and Georgia.”201 
Dmitri Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, described the goals of the economic sanctions as 
nothing short of reversing Georgia’s policies with the statement that “It’s a matter of 
changing their attitude totally.”202  
The spy scandal occurred against the backdrop of Georgia receiving an offer of an 
Intensified Dialogue with NATO. 
According to an update published on the NATO website, “Georgia will have 
access to a more intense political exchange with NATO Allies on its membership 
aspirations and relevant reforms, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision on a 
further membership process. Such consultations take place at different levels, from staff 
talks between the NATO secretariat and Georgian authorities to high-level political 
consultations between Georgia and the North Atlantic Council.”203 The intensified 
dialogue was a significant achievement for Tbilisi because it could be regarded as a 
reward for  “Georgia’s performance on security sector reforms as well as its participation 
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in NATO-led and U.S.-led operations.”204 NATO’s offer of an Intensified Dialogue to 
Georgia was considered by some to be the highpoint of its efforts to move closer toward 
the alliance.205  
Near the end of 2006, Russia began to feel that it was losing its grip on Georgia.  
Georgia had “achieved a solid national consensus for the Western orientation, competent 
and effective governance, an efficient counter-intelligence service, and double-digit 
economic growth this year, despite Russia’s embargo on Georgia’s traditional 
agricultural and wine exports.”206 In addition, Georgia’s importance as an energy transit 
country increased the West’s stake in Georgia’s security and successful development. 
Vladimir Socor wrote in 2006 that at the time Moscow had almost exhausted or lost all 
forms of leverage on Georgia.207 He also made the almost prophetic statement that 
“Short of launching military operations or staging attacks by proxies, Moscow can only 
continue inflicting economic pain on Georgia for some limited period of time, a danger 
point of which will be reached this coming winter. But the main effect of Russia’s 
economic sanctions and psychological warfare can already be seen in the acceleration of 
Georgia’s economic reorientation toward international markets and its overall political 
and strategic reliance on Western partners and allies. Russia is no longer able to halt 
Georgia’s independent developm
D. THE FIVE DAY WAR 
In August 2008, Vladimir Socor’s 2006 observation about possible Russian 
“military operations” became a reality. Russia asserted itself militarily and fought a five 
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day long war with Georgia. The fact Russia and Georgia fought a war is one of the few 
points of agreement concerning the events of August 2008.  
There is major disagreement over who started the conflict. Russia claims that its 
military actions were taken in response to Georgia’s attack on Tshkinvali and the Russian 
peacekeepers that were located there.209 Tshkinvali is the capital of South Ossetia, a 
disputed region that is widely recognized as legally being a part of Georgia. Tbilisi’s 
version of events contradicts the accounts advanced by Russia. Georgia holds that it was 
“faced with a military buildup among South Ossetian forces and unacceptable 
provocation against Georgian villages, it began its assault soon after—but only after—
Russia had begun to move heavy armour through the Roki tunnel onto Georgian 
territory.”210  
A long-awaited report by an ostensibly neutral party, the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, did little to definitively 
solve the question of who was responsible for starting the war. According to a BBC 
report published after the release of the report, Russia asserted that the report “delivered 
an ‘unequivocal answer’ on the question of who started the conflict, while Georgia “said 
the investigation proved that Russia had been preparing for war all along.”211 Georgia is 
not alone in its belief that Russia had long been preparing for war. Andrei Illarionov, a 
former economic advisor to President Putin, held that the war between Russia and 
Georgia is an event that was unavoidable. He argued that, “The Russian leadership had in 
fact taken very important decisions that made war between Russia and Georgia inevitable 
much earlier—between September 1999 and June 2003." The war, in his view, was part 
of the execution of a "Grand Plan" that had existed for years.212 Strobe Talbott expressed 
a similar view although he did not go as far as to claim that Russia had a grand plan. In 
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the preface to Ronald Asmus’ book A Little War that Shook the World, Talbott wrote, 
“for months-indeed, years before Russian tanks rolled through the Roki Tunnel, powerful 
players in Moscow were looking for a pretext for an invasion, occupation, and virtual if 
not literal annexation of Georgian territory.”213 Roy Allison did not discover a grand 
plan, as did Illarionov, but he presented an argument that is supportive of Talbott’s. In his 
view, there is evidence to suggest that Moscow’s actions in Georgia were planned and 
not “defensive and retaliatory” as has been claimed by Moscow.214  
The speed and logistical efficiency with which large Russian contingents 
were sent by land and sea into Abkhazia in August 2008 and then entered 
western Georgia similarly fits the picture of a major operation carefully 
planned by the Russian general staff.215  
It is likely that the debate over who started the war will continue and not conclude 
anytime soon. At this point, the question of who started the war, while important, appears 
to be more of a side issue compared to Russia’s purposes in the war. 
It is clear that through this war Russia has drawn a clear line in the sand in regard 
to Georgia. One of the primary motivations for Russia’s actions appears to be the threat it 
felt from Georgia potentially becoming a member of NATO. Stopping NATO expansion 
in the sphere claimed by Moscow is considered key to Russian national security. Such 
sentiments have been expressed by Russian leaders and intellectuals. Sergey Karaganov, 
a prominent expert on international affairs, was regarded as one of Russia’s leading 
foreign policy experts, believes that 
NATO expansion towards Russian borders and the inclusion in NATO of 
countries whose elites had historical complexes with regard to Russia 
because of their setbacks and defeats in previous centuries, have increased 
anti-Russian sentiments in the alliance. I do hope that Tbilisi's attack on 
South Ossetia and Russia's response to it will prove to be a fruitful episode 
in the historical perspective. The sacrifice—the Ossetians, Russians and 
Georgians who died in that war—may not be in vain. Russian troops gave 
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a strong military rebuff to the logic of NATO's infinite expansion which, if 
not stopped, would inevitably bring about a big war—not in Georgia but 
around Ukraine, almost in the heart of Europe.216  
Also, a 2007 report by a group analyzing what they thought Russia’s position in 
world politics would be in 2017 also raised the issue of NATO enlargement in the post-
Soviet space.  
With respect to Russia, it is important to mention the possibility of armed 
conflicts breaking out near its borders and the danger of getting involved 
in them; the emergence of an unfriendly military-political environment; 
the problem of unrecognized states in the post-Soviet area; and NATO‘s 
further eastward expansion (to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova).217  
Russia’s reliance on political and economic mechanisms allowed it to increase its 
influence or, at the minimum, create acceptable conditions in every state in the Southern 
Caucasus with the exception of Georgia. Georgia was intractable in its refusal to submit 
to Russian pressure. In Russian eyes this refusal was compounded by its desire to join 
NATO, which placed its actions in opposition to Russian national security concerns. In 
the process conditions were created in which Russia was losing control in Georgia and 
facing a threat to its security (whether real or imagined is debatable). Russia also attacked 
Georgia at least in part because it was clear that its reliance on economic and political 
levers had proven ineffective.  
While NATO encroachment was a major security concern, there were three other 
interests that Russia would be able to address by attacking Georgia: controlling energy 
resources, protecting Russian citizens, and maintaining the area as a buffer zone. Aside 
from national security concerns it would also be difficult to rule out an opportunity for 




216 Sergey Karagonov, “Russia, Georgia, the World in 2009,” December 2009, European Stability 
Initiative, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=26 (accessed 3 March 2010) 27. 
217 Timofei Bordachev. “The EU, Russia, and the Caucasus,” December 2009, European Stability 
Initiative, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=26 (accessed 3 March 2010) 28. 
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In the process, Russia was sending a message to a number of parties. The message 
was that Moscow’s interests matter. The message to the United States and NATO was to 
stay out of Russia’s privileged sphere. The message to Georgia was that it should 
reconsider its hostile attitude as well as its desire to join NATO.  
As far as the war’s effect on Georgia’s NATO aspirations, there were clearly 
some setbacks. However, it is unlikely that the war will have any long term effects on 
Georgia’s desire to join the Alliance. As far as Tbilis is concerned, Georgia continues on 
its path to membership. Evidence to this effect can be found in Georgia’s recent 
comprehensive review of its military. Although Georgia has not received a MAP from 
NATO, Tbilisi continues to strive towards eventual membership by acting as though it 
does have a MAP and by working independently toward meeting the standards for NATO 
membership.218 However, Russia retains the ability to destabilize Georgia because of the 
influence that it maintains in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which is a factor that 
complicates Georgia’s bid for membership in the Alliance. According to the 1995 NATO 
Study on Enlargement, solving ethnic and territorial disputes by peaceful means is an 
important consideration for NATO membership. 
States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including 
irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those 
disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. 
Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to 




218 Stratfor, “Georgia: A New Military Strategy,” 4 March 2010, 
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219 Study on NATO Enlargement, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principals of Enlargement, paragraph 6, 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Georgia’s November 2003 Rose Revolution accelerated the country’s quest for 
membership in the main Western security institution, NATO.  Georgia’s prospects for 
membership in the Atlantic Alliance are limited by internal and external factors. The 
internal factors include its uneven progress towards democratization and the challenges 
associated with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The primary 
external factors are Russia’s policy toward Georgia and its influence via Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. This conclusion reviews the impact of these factors on Georgia’s 
prospects and closes with an assessment of the implications of Georgia’s non-accession 
to the Atlantic Alliance in the foreseeable future. 
Georgia has demonstrated remarkable, yet uneven, progress in regard to its 
political, military, and economic reforms. Economically Georgia’s reforms have resulted 
in changes that led to it receiving high marks from institutions such as the World Bank 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Georgia still ranks among 
the top 15 countries in the world in terms of ease of doing business despite the worldwide 
economic downturn.220 An additional sign of success in the Georgian economy is its 
growth in GDP from -10.1 percent in 2009 to 8.4 percent during the second quarter of 
2010.221  Georgia’s economic performance has thus been commendable.  
Tbilisi’s progress on military reforms has been commendable as well. Georgia has 
established democratic and civilian control of its armed forces. Tbilisi has also 
demonstrated that it is capable of contributing militarily to NATO’s new missions. This 
has been evident in its participation in operations in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  
 
 
220 Ranking from the Doing Business 2010 report, http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/ 
(accessed 17 June 2010). 
221 Gross Domestic Product of Georgia in 2010 report, 
http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/nad/GDP_2010Q2_press-release__Eng.pdf (accessed 
23 October 2010). 
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The reforms that require the greatest effort by Georgia in order to increase its 
prospects for NATO membership concern democratization. The need for such reforms is 
raised frequently. It was raised at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 and again at the 
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in 2009. Chief among the issues related to democratization are 
the one-party system, the lack of media freedom, and the manipulation of election 
laws.222 All have been used to enable the United National Movement (UNM) to maintain 
control of the country. They have also led to criticism of the level of democratic 
development in Georgia.  
Georgia has made remarkable progress in democratization. However, continued 
progress is necessary in order to remain credible as a potential member of the alliance. 
Georgia’s political leaders could address the shortcomings associated with the country’s 
democratization if they chose to do so. For example, President Saakashvili and his UNM 
party could take steps to improve the fairness of elections by refraining from any actions 
that are manipulative, or that appear to be manipulative. The central government could 
also relax its control over the media and allow for more diversity in terms of 
programming and viewpoints other than the official party line that dominates the media.  
These two actions alone would improve Tbilisi’s record on democratization and 
also respond to some of the major criticisms that have been directed to it in that regard. 
These steps would also contribute to solving another major problem associated with 
Tbilisi’s effort to democratize—the negative perceptions related to one-party rule. The 
UNM remains popular in Georgia as shown by the May 2010 municipal elections. The 
UNM won at least 55 percent of the vote in every region of the country.223   
Lincoln Mitchell has summed up the situation well. In his judgment, the electoral 
manipulation actions by Saakashvili and the UNM are not only undemocratic but also 
politically unnecessary. Tbilisi is considered by some observers to have been an 
important stronghold for Georgia’s opposition politicians, yet they were routed by the 
 
222 Alexander Cooley, and Lincoln Mitchell, “Georgia: The Interconnections between Democracy and 
Security,” Caucasus Analytical Digest, No. 17 (21 May 2010), 3. 
223 Civil GE election Map, http://www.civil.ge/eng/category.php?id=32&result=proportional 
(accessed 24 October 2010). 
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UNM.224 Saakashvili and the UNM have the ability to address the issues related to 
democratization. Yet they have not taken significant steps to do so.  
Some observers believe that the situation may be getting worse. In October 2010 
Georgia’s parliament, which is dominated by the UNM, passed a controversial 
constitutional amendment by a vote of 112 to 5.225 Supporters of the amendment say that 
it will introduce more checks and balances into the political system by curbing 
presidential powers and strengthening the role of the prime minister.226 Detractors of the 
amendment say that it will allow Saakashvili to hold onto power by seeking the job of 
prime minister after his presidential term ends in 2013.227 Currently the constitution 
forbids Saakashvili from running for President again. Critics like “Vakhtand Dzabiradze, 
a member of a public constitutional commission grouping Georgian legal experts and 
NGOs, are concerned this latest move may represent a serious step back for Georgian 
politics.”228 This latest move by Saakashvili and his party provides more ammunition for 
critics of Georgian democratization. The democratization process is, however, one of the 
factors that Tbilisi could unilaterally cultivate to improve its prospects for NATO 
membership.  
The separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia along with Russia’s 
influence represent internal and external factors that are linked. They constitute the most 
difficult of Georgia’s challenges to solve, and Tbilisi’s ability to meet these challenges 
alone is limited. 
These two issues are linked because both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are within 
the internationally recognized borders of Georgia. Yet Moscow has recognized their 
independence and is deepening its relationship with both republics.  
 
224 Ellen Barry, “Georgia President Aided by Mayoral Election,” New York Times, May 30, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/world/europe/31georgia.html (accessed 24 October 2010). 
225 Georgian Parliament Approves Controversial Constitutional Amendment, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgian_Parliament_Approves_Controversial_Constitutional_Amendment/2





                                                
Neither of the republics appears to desire reconciliation with Tbilisi. They are 
both heavily reliant on Russia for financial support and security. The status quo benefits 
Russia because its presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia serves as a check on NATO 
enlargement as well as a check on Georgia. Russia’s presence serves as a check on 
NATO enlargement because the alliance is unlikely to admit Georgia as long as the status 
of the two regions remains unresolved. Russia’s military presence serves as a check on 
Georgia because the Russian forces provide Moscow with an option to destabilize the 
situation at a time of its choosing. The major difference between Russian military 
positioning in 2010 and 2008 is that Moscow could now invade Georgia much more 
rapidly and extensively. Russia removed its troops from the village of Perevi in October 
2010, and the move was described as “a step in the right direction” by the Georgian 
Foreign Ministry, which also referred to it as “only a microscopic step in the obligations 
Russia must fulfill in line with the August 12, 2008, ceasefire agreement.”229  
It is unlikely that Russia will remove its troops from Georgia anytime soon, 
especially not as long as Georgia continues its quest for NATO membership. Russia’s 
concerns in the region have been relatively consistent. Russia has repeatedly mentioned 
Western encroachment and NATO expansion as threats to its influence in the South 
Caucasus. The only way that Georgia might be able to overcome the challenges 
associated with its separatist regions and Russia’s influence over them is with tangible 
support from the member states of NATO and the European Union. These states have 
expressed support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and have provided 
some aid and assistance, but they have little reason to expect Moscow to change its 
behavior. 
Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership do not appear to be favorable in the 
foreseeable future, barring a major unexpected breakthrough. In order to improve its 
prospects Georgia must make progress on reforms related to democratization as well as 
overcome the issues associated with its separatist regions, which are complicated by 
Russia’s involvement. Georgia has the power to make progress on democratization, 
 
229 Russian Troop Pullout ‘step in right direction’ – Georgian Foreign Ministry, 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101018/161003657.html (accessed 24 October 2010). 
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although recently Tbilisi has not demonstrated the will to do so. As far as the issues 
involving the separatist regions are concerned, Tbilisi appears to have the will to act, but 
lacks the power to do so.  
Whether Georgia becomes a NATO member or not has implications not only for 
Georgia but for NATO and European security as well. Should Georgia fail to become a 
member of NATO, the democratic gains that have been made since the Rose Revolution 
could be reversed in favor of an authoritarian government. The framework for such a 
development, should it occur, is already in place in the form of Saakashvili and his UNM 
party, which dominates the entire government. If Georgia does not become a credible 
democracy, the responsibility will reside mainly with the Georgian people. NATO, the 
European Union, and other outside organizations can offer advice and assistance, but the 
ultimate responsibility rests with the Georgian people and local political elites. 
The greatest beneficiary of Georgia’s failure to obtain membership in NATO 
would be Russia. Significantly increased Russian influence in the region could present a 
threat to the energy security of Europe. The South Caucasus nations of Azerbaijan and 
Georgia are important transit countries for the Nabucco, Trans-Adriatic, and Trans-
Caspian pipelines, which are all at different levels of development.230 They are key 
elements in arrangements designed to diminish Russia’s dominance of east-west pipelines 
providing energy to Europe.231 If Georgia fails to obtain NATO membership and 
subsequently falls back into Russia’s sphere of influence, Moscow will have enhanced 
means to affect Europe’s energy security. Such a scenario could present major challenges 
to the European Union as well as to NATO. It could provide Russia with leverage that 
could be used to weaken both organizations to its benefit by dividing their member states.  
 
 
230 The Abominable Gas Man, http://www.economist.com/node/17260657?story_id=17260657 
(accessed 24 October 2010). 
231 Ibid. 
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